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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact mobile money service Tigo Money has on 
households’ transfer behavior within social networks. To be precise, the paper 
investigates if household that use Tigo Money 1) send and receive more transfers, 
2) if they do this with an expanded network, and 3) if they send and receive more 
transfers for emergency reasons, compared to non-using households. To answer 
these questions, a survey was conducted in two municipalities in Guatemala. The 
data was analyzed using OLS estimations.  
The results show a significant positive correlation between the use of Tigo 
Money and the dependent variables, resulting in increased transfer activity among 
these households. These findings are in line with previous research, and indicate 
that Tigo Money-using households should handle negative income shocks better. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed. The models perform worse for the rural 
subsample, but the results are robust across all estimations for urban and semi-
rural subsamples.  
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1 Introduction 
Today, more than two billion people in developing countries lack access to formal 
financial services like savings accounts, credit, insurance and secure methods for 
payments and transfers (World Bank, 2015:5). At the same time life in developing 
countries can be risky, as no social security can help in the case of a negative 
income shock (i.e. illness, job loss). To reduce risk, households exchange money 
transfers within social networks. This is not always easy or cheap as great 
distances and mediocre infrastructure increase transaction fees. One solution to 
these problems could be mobile money. This paper studies the impact of mobile 
money on transfer behavior among households in Guatemala.  
Mobile money transfers funds electronically through the convenience of an 
individual’s cell phone, and it provides a cheaper and more secure option in 
exchanging money, that in turn improves a household’s ability to reduce risk 
(Gencer, 2010:4). Many believe it has a lot of potential. Experts and workers in 
the area of development are excited, as they believe mobile money may be a key 
for widespread financial inclusion (Beck, 2015:16). Additionally, the user demand 
is there; approximately 300 million users have signed up since mobile money’s 
inception a decade ago. Finally, there is incentive for companies to meet user 
demand. Every year, the supply of mobile money services increases (GSMA, 
2014:15). Currently, the fastest growing market is Latin America. In Guatemala, 
mobile money service Tigo Money, was launched in late 2012. It allows users to 
have a digital wallet and to transfer money from their phone account when they 
want. The funds on the account can then be used for various transactions, often 
sending and receiving funds from other users, as well as paying bills straight from 
the mobile phone.  
Because of mobile money’s infancy, research on its impact on transfer 
behavior is still lacking (Beck, 2015:29). There is a solid theoretical foundation to 
build upon because of the ample research on how social networks form and 
behave (for example see Townsend, 1994; or Fafchamps’ collaborative work, 
2003 and 2007). However, the problem arises because this research does not 
incorporate the time and cost saving characteristics of mobile money (Jack and 
Suri, 2014). Does mobile money affect the transfer behavior between households? 
So far, the published research indicates yes, as more transfers are being sent and a 
more complete insurance enjoyed as resource pooling become more efficient 
(Beck, 2015:29). However, the studies are scarce and only cover a few regions, 
mainly Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The aim of this paper is to further understand how mobile money affects the 
transfer behavior of households. The goal is contribute to current research in two 
ways. Firstly, it applies an analytic framework inspired by previous research on 
social networks, but incorporates the lower transaction costs of mobile money. 
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Secondly, it also expands the geographical reach of the current research by 
focusing on Central America and Guatemala, where the financial infrastructure is 
very different from Sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout the paper, I will answer the 
following three research questions: 
1) Are users of Tigo Money more likely to send and receive transfers than 
households using other methods? 
2) Are users of Tigo Money more likely to send and receive transfer within an 
expanded network of family members and friends, compared to non-users? 
3) Are households using Tigo Money more likely to send and receive transfers 
for emergency support compared to non-using households? 
To answer these questions, survey data was collected in two municipalities in the 
southwestern part of Guatemala, during the period of October and November of 
2015. Given the large sample size and applied survey weights, the results of this 
paper can be generalized to the target population of these two municipalities. 
However, I do not advocate that the results can be generalized to any larger 
region. The survey data is analyzed across various specifications using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions. Sensitivity analysis is done to test the robustness 
of the results.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents information 
about Guatemala and Tigo Money. Chapter 3 presents and elaborates the 
theoretical framework used to understand the impact of mobile money, and 
presents previous research. Next, Chapter 4 presents the methodology used and 
the survey data. In Chapter 5 the results are presented and analyzed. A discussion 
surrounding the results can be found in chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a 
conclusion. 
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2 Background and context 
This short chapter provides the reader with more information about Guatemala 
and the mobile money service Tigo Money.  
2.1 Financial inclusion in Guatemala  
Situated in Central America, Guatemala borders Mexico and Belize to the north, 
and to the west is Honduras and El Salvador. Guatemala is a very poor country, 
and more than half the population lives below the poverty line. Like many other 
countries, Guatemala still struggles with problems in health, education and 
poverty. Demographically, the population is highly heterogeneous, as it consists 
of several different indigenous ethnicities. The biggest group is the Spanish-
speaking Ladinos, of mixed Amerindian-Spanish heritage, which accounts for 
about 60 percent of the population. The other 40 percent are divided among 
several indigenous groups, each with its own language. About half of the 
population lives in rural areas (CIA, 2016). 
 A large percentage of Guatemala’s population is not using any formal 
financial services. Only 40 percent report having an account at a formal financial 
institution, below average compared to the rest of the region, but still about ten 
percentage points higher than Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2015). Where 
Guatemala, and Latin America, really differs from other developing regions is in 
banking infrastructure. The number of branches and ATMs per capita is higher 
than elsewhere (Almazán and Frydrych, 2015:15; Simon, 2012:4). However, there 
is still a big divide in accessibility between rural and urban areas (Almazán and 
Frydrych, 2015:11) Guatemala also differs, as the adoption of mobile phone 
technology is very high, at over 100 percent. This means that there are more 
mobile phone accounts than people. This number is higher than the Sub-Saharan 
number (GSMA, 2015:8).  
Table 1: Sectors of Guatemala 
Sector % of GDP % of labor 
Agriculture 14 38 
Industry 24 14 
Service 62 48 
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2.2 The mobile money service: Tigo Money 
The mobile phone operator Tigo is the largest operator in the country, covering 
more than 52 percent of the population. In 2012 it launched the mobile money 
service Tigo Money in 2012 (Millicom, 2016).  Today it has more than 250 000 
users in the country, and more than 3000 authorized agents. The network of 
agents has rapidly expanded, and the agents are often more accessible than formal 
financial branches. The agents are rarely only Tigo Money agents; instead it is 
operated as a side-business in their grocery store, mobile phone store etcetera 
(Tigo, 2016).  
The service works the following way: the service is operated via free text 
messages, thus allowing the service to be used on any type of mobile phone. To 
register, one only needs a SIM-card from Tigo, along with some form of valid 
identification document at the time of registration. Connected to the mobile phone 
account, is a sort of digital wallet that can hold either cash and/or airtime credit. 
This airtime credit can be exchanged for cash at any agent. Using the phone, the 
Tigo Money user can do a number of activities. First, it can receive international 
remittances. It can also send and receive funds domestically to any mobile phone 
connected to Tigo (not necessarily Tigo Money). Further, additional airtime can 
be purchased using the funds in the account. Finally, many of the country’s largest 
companies are affiliated with Tigo Money, allowing its users to pay bills with the 
funds on their account. The upper limit for transfers is 5000 quetzals in total per 
month1. It is free to receive any international or domestic transfers. To send, there 
is a fee of between 4 percent to send using your phone, and 6 percent from an 
agent. This is a lower cost than for other remittance companies such as Western 
Union or MoneyGram, especially for domestic transfers. There is no interest is 
earned on the fund in the account  (Tigo, 2016).  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 At the time of writing, 5000 quetzles is equal to about 650 USD (1 USD equals about 7.65 quetzales).  
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3 Theoretical framework and previous 
research 
To understand how mobile money affects transfer behavior within social 
networks, a theoretical framework is needed. Without it, research becomes 
descriptive, as there are no assumptions of correlation or causality: the question, 
“why?” becomes very difficult to answer. Therefore, a theoretical framework can 
inform which economic variables to look for, and how they can be expected to 
behave (Esaiasson et al., 2012:37).  
Varian makes an important point about studying new technology: keep your 
eyes on the households, their choices and behavior (2010:668). The theoretical 
framework used in this paper is based on previous research on transfers within 
social networks. Mobile money is in this framework merely a change in the 
variable for transaction costs 
This chapter is structured the following way. Firstly, the theoretical 
framework is presented and discussed in detail. Secondly, previous research on 
social networks and mobile money is presented. Lastly, the paper’s hypotheses are 
presented.  
3.1 Theoretical framework  
This section elaborates in detail how social networks are formed, why they 
transfer money and how transfer costs are incorporated into the model.  
3.1.1 How households view risk 
Households’ attitudes towards risk differ; some can tolerate more insecurity, 
while others cannot. Research has shown that amongst the general population, the 
majority of households are expected to be risk-averse. The main characteristics of 
risk-aversion is fearing financial risk and avoiding it if possible. If a household is 
assumed to behave rationally, its attitude towards financial risk is based on 
expected utility. This is a probability-weighted average of the utility the 
household can get in a situation from each given outcome. A risk-averse 
household generally picks the less risky choice, when given two choices having 
the same expected utility. A risk-averse attitude also implies that a household tries 
to avoid losses, and it prefers a certain minimum level of utility, rather than 
exposing themselves to risk in order to increase utility (Perloff, 2009:578-581). 
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Given that households are risk-averse, the question arises how they can avoid 
risk? 
3.1.2 How households can avoid risk 
In theory, there are several ways a household can avoid risky financial situations 
(Perloff, 2009:585-587). First, households can abstain from financially risky 
decisions, and simply say no to something they deem too unpredictable. Next, the 
household can obtain more information that enables them to better assess a 
situation, and more likely reduce risk. Additionally, households should not put all 
eggs in one basket. Instead, a household should diversify its financial activities 
and investments. Doing so spreads risk and reduces volatility. Lastly, households 
can buy insurance to reduce risk since a certain level of utility is secured by doing 
so.  
In developed financial markets, services are available in helping households 
avoid risk by providing information and transparency. In contrast, there is no 
market supply with these types of services in developing countries. Finding 
reliable financial data can be very difficult due to corruption, information 
asymmetries, and instable social structures, thus making it harder to assess current 
and future risks. Diversification is also difficult because there is no access to 
formal financial services, like savings, investment account, or social security; nor 
are any companies willing to sell individuals insurance because the company 
cannot afford the high costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts. Eradicating 
financial risk in a household is impossible. Households are affected by numerous 
factors like, droughts, crop failures and illnesses, which are out of their control 
(Todaro and Smith, 2011:730-731). 
3.1.3 The lack of formal finance and the formation of social networks 
Thus far, two aspects has been covered: households typically dislike financial 
risk, and avoid it altogether if they are able; in developing countries, there is no 
market supply of financial services to help households mitigate risk (Perloff, 
2009:588; Varian, 2010:229).  
What can be done? As it turns out, households have turned to informal 
financial services instead. For this paper, the most important informal 
arrangement is risk pooling. What is risk pooling? Statistically, a household is 
very unlikely to experience a severe negative income shock (for example, a 
husband breaks his leg and cannot work) because occurrences are rare. However, 
it if does happen, the household will be in deep financial trouble, as it may be 
unable to cover the loss in income (either through savings, insurance or loans). 
However, if several households decide to pool resources, essentially forming a 
social network, together they are better able to handle any negative income 
shocks. Why? Because the risk is spread simultaneously amongst more 
households and their collective resources are increased. This works as long as 
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there are minimal negative income shocks happening to the same social network 
at the same time (Frank, 2008:188). As previous research has shown, these social 
networks vary in size, geographical reach and social composition (Todaro and 
Smith, 2011: 696). What they do have in common is resource-pooling 
arrangements to avoid risk.  
So far, no attention has been paid to the actual transfers; it is assumed they just 
happen. In fact, they are modeled as having no fees. However in developing 
countries, this is far from the truth; the costs are often quite high (Jack and Suri, 
2014:1). It is here where mobile money enters the theoretical framework. 
3.1.4 The role mobile money and reduced transaction costs 
The fact is, there are several types of costs for making transfers within networks. 
Generally, they can be divided into two types: fixed and proportional. Fixed costs 
are independent of the size of the transfer. An example is the cost of travelling to 
and from the Tigo Money agent to send the transfer: no matter if an individual is 
sending $10 or $100, the bus fare is the same. Another example of a fixed cost is 
the alternative cost in which the time spent sending the transfer could have been 
spent on other economic activities. On the other hand, proportional costs depend 
on the size of the transfer. Fees for transferring funds can be both fixed and 
proportional (Jack and Suri, 2014:5-6).  
The cost of transferring funds is what prevents households to fully smooth 
consumption within their social network. This is because some of the funds that 
should have gone to smooth consumption now have to be spent on fees. Fixed 
costs makes smaller transfers to be postponed because the costs of making the 
transfer is too great in relation to the amount sent. Basically, if you intend to send 
$10, but the bus fare is $8, it does not make economic sense to make the 
transaction. On the other hand, larger transfers make economic sense to send. In 
relation to proportional costs, all transfers will be sent. However, consumption 
smoothing will never be complete because the proportional cost will eat away 
some of the funds available to the receiver (Jack and Suri, 2014:6). 
 What mobile money technology does is reduce the costs associated with 
transferring costs. This affects the transfer behavior in three ways: First, as 
explained above, fixed costs make smaller transfers uneconomical to send. 
However, if mobile money lowers the cost, more small transfers will be feasible 
to send. Therefore, the first effect of mobile money will increase transfers sent 
within the network. Second, higher costs force the network to be more selective 
when choosing when to transfer. However, now that transfers are cheaper and sent 
more often, more network members can be involved. For example, without mobile 
money, only one transfer is sent within the network. Because of lower costs, this 
transfer can then be broken to two, and more than one household can now share 
the costs. Hence, the second effect of mobile money is that it includes more 
members in the network. Third, if the effects of one and two are combined, 
consumption smoothing is more efficient within the network, and its members are 
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more insured that they would have been without mobile money (Jack and Suri, 
2014:6) 
3.2 Previous research 
With the theoretical framework in place, it is time to review on previous literature. 
The first section discusses the research done before mobile money boomed. The 
next section expands on this literature, as mobile money is incorporated into the 
analysis.  
3.2.1 Research done before mobile money 
There have been numerous papers published studying how people in developing 
countries use social networks to reduce risk and smooth consumption. Townsend 
(1994; 1995) was an early contributor, using panel data to observe how 
households in three Indian villages used informal credit markets and intra-village 
transfers to smooth consumption. With data from Nigeria, Udry (1994) also saw 
how households tap into informal village networks to mitigate financial risk 
through small informal loans with state-contingent repayment conditions. Both 
papers observed how the consumption smoothing is never complete as this is very 
difficult to achieve.   
These initial findings have been confirmed and expanded upon by later 
research. One example is the work of Grimard (1997), who used data from Cote 
d’Ivoire to find that consumption smoothing is indeed not complete. Another 
example is Fafchamps’ collaborative work (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; 
Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). With data from the Philippines, they found that 
transfers in the form of gifts and informal loans are preferred for smoothing risk, 
rather than selling household assets. Another conclusion is that the main 
connection within networks is not proximity with other members of the village; 
instead, social proximity matters more as networks consist of family and friends, 
and stretch well beyond the local population of the village. These findings are 
interesting because Townsend and Udry did not seek to examine this, as they only 
examined networks within a village. More examples of additional research 
confirming the use of transfers as a tool for insurance and consumption smoothing 
are Gertler and Gruber (2002), as well as De Weerdt and Dercon (2006). Both 
papers examine how social networks provide informal insurance against illness. 
With a different approach, Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003), find that remittances 
can help households keep their children in school. 
My interpretations of these findings are that many social factors, such as 
kinship and proximity, affect the formation of network. Social factors can be 
difficult to capture in a dataset. However, the literature proves that households do 
indeed use transfers (both gifts and loans) within social networks as a form of 
informal financial service to mitigate financial risk and smooth consumption. But 
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none of this research incorporated the cost reduction due to mobile money. To 
find that, one needs to turn to more recent literature.  
3.2.2 Recent research incorporating mobile money 
As noted by Jack and Suri (2014), there are few research papers published on the 
implications of lower costs and easier transactions on transfer behavior within 
networks. However, there is a growing body of literature and more research is 
being done. 
Yang and Choi (2007) were some of the first to look closely at how 
remittances and transaction costs can be used as a form of informal insurance by 
households in the Philippines. Aycinena et al. (2010) performed a randomized 
field experiment amongst immigrants from El Salvador living in Washington 
D.C., showing that lower transaction fees resulted in an increased frequency in 
remittances sent. Schulhofer-Wohl (2007) also incorporated transaction costs into 
his analysis, and finds that the fees do contribute to imperfect insurance, since 
some of the resources has to be spent on just the transfer itself. Mbiti and Weil’s 
(2014) findings indicate that socioeconomic status matters in mobile money, as 
shown in M-Pesa users in Kenya. Generally, they were younger, wealthier, better 
educated, used banking services, were non-farmers, and lived in urban areas. They 
also reached the conclusion that mobile money increases the frequency of 
transfers. Finally, Jack and Suri (2011 and 2014), as well as Jack et al. (2013), 
also focus on the use of M-Pesa. In their work, they explicitly examine how 
mobile money’s lower transaction costs affect transfers. They find that users of 
M-Pesa both send and receive more remittances, as well as including more 
households in the network.  
These results, analyzing data from both the field and controlled experiments, 
show a strong indication that reduced costs of transferring money does indeed 
lead to more economic activity within social networks. The results do infer that 
users of mobile money send more transfers. 
3.2.3 Hypothesis for the rest of the paper  
Theory, along with findings of previous research, strongly indicates that mobile 
money does increase the frequency of transfers. Based on this, I work with the 
following hypothesis: 
• Users of Tigo Money are more likely than no-users to either send or 
receive a transfer. 
• Users of Tigo Money are more likely to send or receive transfer from a 
more extended social network, here defined as someone outside of the 
closest family (i.e. not to a spouse, child, parent or sibling). 
• Users of Tigo Money are more likely to send or receive a transfer for 
emergency reasons. 
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4 Methodology and data 
Researchers should always present and discuss their choice of research design. 
Otherwise, reproducibility suffers and results cannot be independently tested and 
confirmed (Esaiasson et al., 2012:220). In this chapter, I discuss the design 
choices for this paper, so the reader understands how the data was collected and 
analyzed.  
In short, a stratified multistage probability cluster sampling design was used, 
interviewing sampled households about their financial activities, with a focus on 
their transfers. Surveys are a common method used in development economics 
with, a rich literature on the topic (United Nations, 2000:4; World Bank, 
2000a:55). The collected data is analyzed using OLS regression models.  
The first section discusses the field methodology: the survey and questionnaire 
design. Next, the OLS specification is presented and discussed. The inherent 
limitations of both methods are addressed throughout the chapter. Finally, the 
collected data is presented.  
4.1 Field methodology  
Nearly all data regarding the use of mobile money in Central America is either 
aggregate macro data, or anecdotal case studies. Therefore, I decided to conduct a 
survey, as it allows me to gather data about my target population, their transfer 
behavior, and the use of mobile money at the individual household level. 
4.1.1 Target population and uptake area 
The survey was conducted in the municipalities of Panajachel and Santa Cruz La 
Laguna2. They were chosen because they represent very different sides of 
Guatemala. Panajachel is a larger urban area, divided in four sectors. The 
municipality of Santa Cruz, on the other hand, can be characterized as semi-rural 
and indigenous, and includes an additional five rural villages in the administrative 
unit. Panajachel and Santa Cruz have an established user base for Tigo Money, 
whereas no data could be found about the adoption rate for the rural villages.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 However, the name is almost always shortened to just Santa Cruz, something that will be done throughout the 
rest of this paper. 
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These three types of locations, i.e. urban, semi-rural and rural, are very different. 
Panajachel is growing, and is well connected to the rest of the country. Therefore 
the city is the economic hub for surrounding municipalities, providing a range of 
different financial services, such as bank branches, and a more developed service 
sector. Semi-rural Santa Cruz can only be accessed by boat, and has only a few 
businesses. However, it does have a Tigo Money agent. The rural villages are 
even less connected, with virtually no service sector. Two villages are only 
accessible by boat, while the other three are located up in the mountains, more 
than a one-hour car ride away from Santa Cruz.  
 
Table 2: Demographic data over target population 
 Population % Ladino % Indigenous 
Panajachel 17361 36 59 
Santa Cruz 7983 1 99 
4.1.2 Sampling design 
To ensure enough interviews were conducted in the rural villages, I decided to 
geographically stratify the target population into ten strata based on local 
administrative units, which includes Panajachel’s four urban sectors, Santa Cruz 
and the five rural communities. This division is appropriate, as these units cover 
the entire target population, are large enough and do not overlap, and are 
relatively internally homogenous (United Nations, 2005:14; Kumar, 2006:16) 
A cluster design was used to reduce the costs of, and time spent, traveling 
between households (United Nations, 2008:54). Due to differences in the 
household listings, the sample frames differ between strata. Surprisingly, Santa 
Cruz and the rural communities had a complete, and up-to-date household listing. 
Therefore, simple random sampling was used to select clusters, each cluster 
consisting of five households. In the next step, every household in the cluster was 
interviewed. Finally, in some of the smaller rural communities, disproportionate 
sampling was used to ensure enough households were interviewed (Kumar, 
2006:17) 
Due to rapid increase in population in the previous years, there was no 
complete or up-to-date household listing for Panajachel. To limit the risk of 
sampling bias, I asked for an official map of the city’s streets, and made this my 
sampling frame instead (Esaiasson et al., 2012:175). Thus, the cluster sampling 
was based on spatial information about city streets. First, in each neighborhood, 
three streets were randomly selected. Then, systematic sampling was used, and 
every second household on each street was interviewed. However, I suspect that 
not every street and alley would be marked on the map, and there might be some 
sampling bias for Panajachel.  
In some of the strata, some households were occupied by foreigners (mainly 
Americans and Europeans). Since they did not belong to the target population 
they were omitted from the sampling frame (United Nations, 2005:21). Important 
to note, users of Tigo Money were oversampled in both the rural and urban strata 
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to ensure enough interviews were conducted so that a meaningful comparison 
could be made between users and non-users.  
Another potential issue for survey sampling is non-response; some household 
cannot, or will not participate. For this study, non-response due to unwillingness 
was not a problem. When a household was approached, it very rarely opted out of 
participation. Instead, non-response was more common because no one was home, 
less so in rural areas, and a bit more common in Panajachel. When no individual 
was present in the household, the solution was to move on to the next household. 
Finally, since both municipalities had updated data on the general 
demographics of their population, the sample was weighted according to location 
and ethnicity, to further minimize with sampling bias (Esaiasson et al., 2012:180).  
4.1.3 Interviews and the questionnaire  
For each sampled household, an interview was conducted with the person 
responsible for transfers. To build rapport with the interviewee, they were 
guaranteed anonymity and then briefly informed about the survey (Esaiasson et 
al., 2012:238).  
However, there can be complications surrounding interviews and the design of 
questionnaires, and they need to be addressed. One problem can be blanks, which 
is when answers to individual questions are missing. This was not an issue for my 
questionnaire due to two factors. First, the interpreter that conducted the interview 
filled out the answer sheet, and respondents could not skip a question (which 
happens when respondents fill out questionnaires on their own). Second, no 
questions were of sensitive nature. For example, drug use or sexual questions 
were not asked. The most sensitive question asked was regarding food security 
but they were worded in such a way as to not judge or offend anyone. These 
questions were adapted from well-tested surveys (Kumar, 2006). Additionally, I 
tried to keep response bias and interviewer effect to a minimum, as two local 
women conducted the interviews and I was not present to skew answers.  
Another problem in household surveys can be recall bias, which is when 
people have difficulty remembering the correct answer to a question regarding the 
past. I dealt with this issue in three ways. First, I limited my recall period to four 
week, a very sensible timeframe. Second, I asked about activities that were out of 
the ordinary (i.e. incoming transfers), and omitted daily activities. Third, I used 
funnel sequences: the questions in my survey go from more general to specific 
(USAID, 2006:7-12). Take transfer for example: the first question will ask if there 
have been any transfers. Then the questions that follow ask for more details like, 
whom, why, and how.  
To address potential errors with translation, two independent translators “back 
translated” the questionnaire: one translated the surveys to Spanish and the other 
translated it back to English. This way, any inconsistencies could be addressed. 
The women conducting the interviews were fluent in both Spanish and Kaqchikel, 
as the latter is the primary language in many households (World Bank, 2000:53-
54). Finally, except for continuous variables like age, I utilized closed-ended 
  13 
questions. This constraints the answer that respondents can give, but makes the 
household data much easier to handle and analyze (Esaiasson, 2012:230). To 
ensure that the multiple answers were sensible, they vetted through the local non-
profit organization as well as Tigo Money agents. 
4.1.4 Testing the survey design: the field test 
Finally, I conducted a field test. It is a crucial step, as it controls for the limitations 
listed in previous sections: the sampling process, the interview situation and its 
robustness of the questionnaire. For the test, fifteen households were randomly 
sampled, the number needed to detect the majority of the problems (World Bank, 
2000a:55; Kumar, 2006:14). The outcome of the test resulted in some 
formulations being tweaked and additional answer alternatives were added.  
4.2 Description of the survey data 
As it is common, the questionnaire consisted of different modules, and the 
following was information was solicited (United Nations, 2005:38): basic 
household demographics were asked, occupation, and recent transfer activity. 
Additionally, data was gathered on the household’s use of financial services, such 
as savings, loans and insurance[s]. Finally, questions were asked about mobile 
phone ownership and any use of Tigo Money3. The individual questions in the 
survey were adapted from previous surveys. The literature stresses the importance 
of this, as semantics take time to work through (Esaiasson et al., 2012:241; World 
Bank, 2000a:55). In total, 467 interviews were completed. 
Demographic information about the sample can be seen below. Overall, there 
are big differences between the urban, semi-rural and rural subsamples. 
Households in Panajachel are generally more educated, use more financial 
services, especially insurance coverage, and is more likely to possess at least one 
mobile phone. The use of financial services is much lower in Santa Cruz and the 
rural villages: with low rates of savings and almost no insurance coverage.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 For the complete questionnaire used, please see Appendix A.  
Table 3: Summary statistics  
Variables Mean St.d Min Max 
Age (years) 35.9 13.7 18 86 
Education (years) 6.2 5.5 0 24 
Food security (0-9) 6.1 2 0 9 
Nr. of adults 3.4 1.8 1 11 
Nr. of assets 1.4 0.6 0 4 
Nr. of transfers 0.3 0.5 0 4 
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Table 4: Summary statistics for subsamples  
Variables (mean values) Total Rural Semi-rural Urban 
Age (years) 
Education (years) 
Food Security (0-9) 
Number of adults 
Number of assets 
35.9 38.7 38 33.9 
6.2 1.3 3.7 9.4 
6.1    
3.4 2.8 3 3.8 
1.4    
Table 5: Frequency table for household statistics 
Variables Total Rural Semi-rural Urban 
Save 197 19 10 168 (42.2%) (15.6%) (11.4%) (65.4%) 
 
Loan 120 29 25 66 (25.7%) (23.8%) (28.4%) (25.7%) 
 
Insurance 64 7 0 57 (13.7%) (5.7%) 0 (22.2%) 
 
Mobile Phone 423 106 79 238 (90.6%) (86.9%) (89.8%) (92.6%) 
 
Use Tigo Money 105 3 32 70 (22.5%) (2.5%) (36.4%) (27.3%) 
 Occupation 
Business operator 152 1 2 146 (32.6%) (0.8%) (2.3%) (58%) 
 
Public 17 2 1 14 (3.6%) (1.6%) (1.1%) (5.5%) 
 
Agriculture 45 30 2 13 (9.6%) (24.6%) (2.3%) (5.1%) 
 
Dayworker 179 68 68 43 (38.3%) (55.7%) (77.3%) (16.7%) 
 
Other 74 21 15 38 (15.9%) (17.2%) (17.1%) (14.8%) 
 
Extra Income 118 8 22 88 (25.3%) (6.6%) (25%) (34.2%) 
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4.3 Econometric modeling 
In this section, the OLS model is specified in detail, and then I discuss the basis 
for the explanatory variables used. Lastly there is a section discussing the 
limitation of cross-sectional studies. 
4.3.1 Model specification 
Each of the three models has a binary dependent variable, and they are analyzed 
using OLS regressions. The use of OLS on binary outcome variables procedure is 
widespread in economics, and it provides more transparency as the model is easier 
to implement and interpret (Donkers and Melenberg, 2002). Coefficients of 
independent variables indicate how much the variables affect the probability that 
the outcome of interest will happen. The null hypothesis for all three models is 
that using Tigo Money has no effect on the dependent variable. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the models have statistical significant effect on the outcome 
variable.  
All three models include the same sets of independent variables. The general 
specification is the following: 
 ! =  !1+  !2!"#$ +  !5!!!"#$#%&' +  !3!!!"#$%&'(!!"# +  !4!!!""#$%&'()  +  !6!"#$%&"' +  ! 
 
Where Y is the outcome of interest, User is a dummy for whether or not the 
household has at least one Tigo Money user in the last 4 weeks, HHFinances is a set 
of dummy variables for savings, loans, insurance and the number of household 
assets. HHDemographics is a group of variables on the household demographics; 
HHOccupation is a set of dummy variables of income generating activities, and 
finally Location, a categorical variable distinguishes whether the household is 
located in an urban, or semi-rural or rural area 
To test robustness, each model is built up gradually by adding a new set of 
control variables in several steps (White and Lu, 2014:195). This allows a deeper 
understanding of the model’s independent variables, and how they affect the 
dependent variable.  
Thus, in full detail, the general specification is the following:  
 ! =  !1+  !2!"#$ +  !3!"#$%&' +  !4!"#$% +  !5!"#$%&"'( + !6!""#$" +  !7!"# +  !8!"#$%&'() +  !9!"#$%"$& +  !10!"#$%& + !11!!!"#$%&'()* +  !12!"#$%&&'(")#*$ +  !13!"#$%&'()*+ + !14!"#$%&'ℎ!"# +  !15!"#$%&"' +  !  
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The above specification will be used throughout the analysis. What will be altered 
is the dependent variable. For Model 1, the dependent variable has two outcomes: 
either the household has received or sent a transfer in the last 4 weeks, or it has 
not. For Model 2, the dependent variable is: in the last 4 weeks, has the household 
sent or received a transfer within an expanded network, or not. Expanded network 
is defined as transferring with a relative or friend (i.e. someone that is not a 
spouse, child, parent or sibling). Finally, in Model 3 the dependent variable is: in 
the last 4 weeks, has the household sent or received a transfer that is classified as 
emergency, or not. 
4.3.2 Testing the model specifications  
The data was checked for normality, which led to the detection and correction of 
some coding errors. All estimations are done with robust standard errors, which 
are used to avoid heteroscedasticy. The estimations are also controlled for 
multicollinearity; none was detected. Finally, to test the robustness of the basic 
specification, a sensitivity analysis is performed. This way, any differences 
between subgroup and the baseline specification can be detected and analyzed 
(Magnus and Vasnev, 2013:3; Clarke, 2006:2). The results of the sensitivity 
analysis are presented in the next chapter.  
4.3.3 Limitations of cross-sectional data and OLS   
The survey data used in this study is cross-sectional, meaning it represents a 
snapshot of the world. Just like there are limitations to the survey methodology, 
there are inherent limitations with cross-sectional data and OLS. These limitations 
are addressed in this section.   
One of the most obvious limitations with cross-sectional data is that it cannot 
be used to detect causality. Since the data is only a snapshot of economic 
activities, it cannot detect any dynamics within, and between the variables. What 
cross-sectional data can indicate is, correlation between variables and how strong 
the correlation is. This is definitely a drawback when compared to panel data 
(Doss, 2006:9). However, cross-sectional studies have their merits as well. One 
merit is that it is often a much cheaper alternative to longitude studies, which 
require a commitment in both time and resources. Cross-sectional studies can 
therefore be a useful tool for discovering new correlations, or empirically testing 
theoretical concepts in the field. 
Another problem with cross-sectional data is reverse causation. Since it cannot 
trace causality, one cannot determine what is causing what. As an example, if 
people already receive numerous transfers, does this result in the individual being 
more likely to sign up for Tigo Money (which might further increase their 
frequency of transfers)? Again, this was something I could not test for because I 
did not have panel data to track the economic activities of the households in my 
sample. However, the theoretical framework is based on research with panel data, 
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and my findings are in line with results of panel data. If it turns out that 
households that transfer a lot do sign up for Tigo Money, it reinforces the fact that 
mobile money does provide benefits for households.   
4.3.4 Explanatory variables 
This section briefly elaborates the expected effect of some of the variables 
included in the model (Doss, 2006:12). For a detailed discussion, I refer the reader 
to chapter three where the theoretical framework for this study was presented. 
The inclusion of User is obvious, as the use of Tigo Money is of great interest. 
It is assumed to have a positive effect on the dependent variables. HHFinances, with 
Savings, Loans, Insurance and Assets, is included as the variables are expected to 
have a negative effect on the dependent variable. In HHDemographics, the number of 
adults is expected to increase the number of transfers, as it could indicate access 
to a larger social network.  
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5 Results 
In this chapter the results from the OLS estimations are presented and analyzed. 
Each model is discussed separately. Lastly, the result from the sensitivity analysis 
is elaborated.   
Overall, the results are robust even as more sets of independent variables are 
added. More importantly, I find that the use of Tigo Money has a significant 
positive correlation with an increased transfer activity for households.  
5.1 Model 1: Probability of participating in a transfer 
This model examines which independent variables affect the probability of a 
household either sending or receiving a transfer. As seen in Table 6, summary 
statistics indicate that users of Tigo Money participate in more transfers on 
average; 0.88 during the recall period compared to just 0.06 for non-users.  
The results for Model 1 can be seen in 
Table A. Column (4) shows that users 
of Tigo Money are almost 69 percent 
more likely to participate in a transfer 
compared to non-users. This positive correlation is significant at the one percent 
significance level. The result is in line with findings in previous literature, as well 
as the theoretical framework.  
As some variables could affect only sending, Column (5) shows the result 
when the depended variable is a dummy if the household has sent a transfer. 
Again the use of Tigo Money significantly correlates with transfer activity, as 
household using mobile money are 22 percent more likely to send a transfer than 
non-user. The effect is significant at the one percent level. Savings is also 
significantly affecting the outcome, and indicates that households with savings 
transfer more to other households. Instead of simply holding the money, the 
household may choose transfer it to other households (for example see Udry, 
1994). Column (6) shows which variables affect the probability of a household 
receiving a transfer, and once more User is significant at the one percent level.  
Loans is significant across all specifications, with a positive effect on the 
probability of receiving a transfer. The effect was not expected. However, a loan 
could indicate a lack of resources, and that receiving transfers are beneficial for 
the household. The result also suggests that household in need of resources, utilize 
both transfers and financial services. This discussion will be resumed in the next 
chapter, as the variable Loans will behave unexpectedly in more models.  
 
Table 6: Transfers Total Non-users Users 
Average number 
 of transfers 0.25 0.06 0.88 
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Table A: estimation on probability of sending or receiving transfer. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Set 1 Sets 1 and 2 Sets 1,2,3 Full To send  To receive 
User 0.659*** 0.659*** 0.664*** 0.648*** 0.219*** 0.429*** 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.036) (0.057) 
Savings -0.051** -0.068** -0.061** -0.042 -0.019* -0.024 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.011) (0.029) 
Loans 0.093** 0.103** 0.1** 0.097** 0.017* 0.08** 
 (0.042) (0.04) (0.039) (0.039) (0.009) (0.04) 
Insurance  0.044 0.029 0.015 0.024 0.016 0.008 
 (0.049) (0.043) (0.039) (0.039) (0.02) (0.043) 
Assets 0.011 0.006 0.017 0.01 0.0001 0.01 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.036) (0.014) 
       
Age  0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001** 0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) 
Education  0.006 0.007* 0.008** 0.0002 0.008* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Adults  -0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.008** -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Spanish  -0.019 -0.014 -0.004 0.016 -0.019 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.03) (0.014) (0.032) 
Food security  0.013** 0.012* 0.006 0.002 0.003 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
       
Business operator   -0.001 0.007 -0.008 0.016 
   (0.038) (0.037) (0.011) (0.037) 
Dayworker   0.003 -0.019 0.003 -0.022 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.008) (0.03) 
Other   0.121** 0.114* 0.042** 0.072 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.017) (0.062) 
Public   0.025 0.019 -0.014 0.033 
   (0.046) (0.046) (0.019) (0.054) 
Extra Income   -0.026 -0.033 -0.008 -0.025 
   (0.024) (0.024) (0.012) (0.025) 
Mobile Phone   -0.091 -0.1 -0.005 -0.095 
   (0.065) (0.065) (0.009) (0.065) 
       
Semi-rural    0.155*** 0.083*** 0.072 
    (0.054) (0.01) (0.054) 
Urban    -0.042 0.004 -0.046 
    (0.031) (0.013) (0.033) 
       
Constant 0.027 -0.114 -0.047 0.001 -0.02 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.075) (0.066) (0.066) (0.026) (0.065) 
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467 
R-squared 0.437 0.453 0.479 0.494 0.257 0.285 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The other significant variables for the full model (4), are Education (p<0.05), 
Other (p<0.1) and Semi-rural (p<0.01), each with a positive effect. The effect of 
education might at first seem small, but since it is measured in years the effect 
adds up. The significance of Semi-rural is interesting, as it indicates that 
households in Santa Cruz, without formal financial services but with a Tigo 
Money agent, are more likely to participate in transfers.  
Finally, surprisingly neither Insurance nor Assets are significant in any of the 
models. Thus, so far it seems like the variables for household finances do not have 
the expected behavior.  
5.2 Model 2: Probability of extended network  
In the second model, the dependent variable is the probability of sending or 
receiving a transfer within a more expanded network, which is defined as 
someone that is a relative or friend, but not a close family member (spouse, child, 
parent or sibling). Table 7 shows how this type of transfer is more common 
among Tigo Money users than for non-users: about every fifth transfer for the 
latter group, but for users it is more than half of all transfers. 
Looking beyond summary statistics, the regression results can be seen in table 
B. Once more the results clearly show that User has a strong positive correlation 
with the probability of receiving or sending transfers within an expanded network. 
The effect is significant at the one percent significance level across the three 
versions of the fully specified model. The results indicate that users of Tigo 
Money are 45 percent more likely of transferring with a more diverse range of 
participant. Previous literature supports this result. This result holds for columns 
(5) and (6) as well.  
In the full model, all four variables in the subgroup HHfinances are significant 
for at least the ten percent level: Savings, Loans, Insurance and Assets. Again 
Loans has a positive effect, as does Assets. In addition, the results are different for 
Column (5) or (6). Now the location dummy for Santa Cruz is significant at the 
one percent level. The correlation is positive for sending transfers, but negative 
for receiving. This result strongly indicates that households in Santa Cruz send 
more within a wider network compared to other subsamples, but that they also 
receive less.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Transfers to expanded network 
 Total Non-users Users 
Transfer to: Nr % Nr % Nr % 
Family 56 51.9 18 81.8 38 44.2 
Extended 52 48.1 4 18.2 48 55.8 
Total 108 100 22 100 86 100 
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Table B: Transfers to expanded network 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Set 1 Sets 1 and 2 Sets 1,2,3 Full To send To receive 
User 0.449*** 
(0.051) 
0.437*** 
(0.051) 
0.442*** 
(0.051) 
0.445*** 
(0.051) 
0.174*** 
(0.036) 
0.265*** 
(0.049) 
Savings -0.031* 
(0.018) 
-0.05* 
(0.026) 
-0.047** 
(0.024) 
-0.05** 
(0.025) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.033 
(0.024) 
Loans 0.066* 
(0.038) 
0.07* 
(0.036) 
0.073* 
(0.037) 
0.0735* 
(0.037) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.061 
(0.038) 
Insurance  -0.035 
(0.03) 
-0.045 
(0.032) 
-0.058* 
(0.034) 
-0.059* 
(0.034) 
0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.077** 
(0.033) 
Assets 0.012 
(0.01) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.02* 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
       
Age  -0.0001 (0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.0002) 
-9.99e 
(0.001) 
Education  0.003 (0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Adults  0.005 (0.004) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Spanish  0.027 (0.026) 
0.033 
(0.026) 
0.032 
(0.027) 
0.02 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
Food security  0.004 (0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
       
Business operator   0.012 (0.035) 
0.01 
(0.035) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
0.017 
(0.033) 
Dayworker   -0.012 (0.023) 
-0.01 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
Other   0.065 (0.052) 
0.066 
(0.052) 
0.046*** 
(0.017) 
0.021 
(0.052) 
Public   0.048 (0.047) 
0.048 
(0.047) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
0.066 
(0.05) 
Extra Income    -0.031 (0.022) 
-0.03 
(0.021) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.017 
(0.02) 
Mobile Phone    -0.075 (0.058) 
-0.073 
(0.058) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.069 
(0.057) 
       
Semi-rural    -0.018 (0.02) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
-0.058*** 
(0.017) 
Urban    0.012 (0.023) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.021) 
       
Constant 0.004  
(0.019) 
-0.043  
(0.048) 
0.019  
(0.051) 
0.008  
(0.05) 
-0.017  
(0.024) 
0.027  
(0.044) 
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467 
R-squared 0.325 0.334 0.355 0.356 0.208 0.191 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.3 Model 3: Probability of emergency transfers 
In model 3, it is investigated which variables affect the probability of a household 
sending or receiving an emergency transfer. Table 8 indicates that users of Tigo 
Money send and receive more transfers for emergency reasons.  
 
As can be seen, for users of Tigo Money one third of all transfers are for 
emergency reasons, compared to one in five for non-users. The results of the 
regression model provide more info, as seen in Tabel C. 
As with previous models, User is positively correlated with the probability of 
receiving or sending an emergency transfer. The effect is significant on the one 
percent significance level. However, the correlation is weaker than in previous 
models. Overall the result, except for the effect of Tigo Money, seems less robust 
than previous models. This is true for the column (5) and (6) as well. There might 
be several reasons for this, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
5.4 Sensitivity analysis  
This section further tests the robustness of the models. I do this in two ways: by 
dividing the sample into subsamples, and then by trying a new specification.   
In the first sensitivity analysis, the observations are divided into three 
subsamples based on their geographical location: rural, semi-rural and urban. 
Then each subsample goes through the same estimations as above. The results can 
be found in Appendix B, and presents several interesting findings. To begin with, 
the general results are not valid for the rural subsample. User is not significant in 
any of the specification. Instead, twice Loans is significant at the five percent 
significance level with a positive effect, and ExtraIncome is significant once, also 
with a positive effect. The model is having a hard time to estimate transfer activity 
for the rural subsample, which reduces the robustness of the baseline models.  
When running the models for Santa Cruz and Panajachel, the results are very 
different. User is significant again, and the coefficient is even larger. Overall, for 
Santa Cruz and Panajachel the same variables are significant, and the coefficients 
are generally larger. The exception is the Santa Cruz subsample in Model 2, 
where the variables Savings, Loans, Insurance and Assets lose their significance. 
This is likely due to the fact, that in the main sample it is mostly the households in  
  
Table 8: Transfers for emergency reasons 
 Total Non-user User 
Reason Nr % Nr % Nr % 
Emergency 33 7.1 6 18.2 27 25.7 
Other 71 92.9 16 81.8 55 74.3 
Total 104  22  82  
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Table C: Probability of transfers for emergency reasons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Set 1 Sets 1 and 2 Sets 1,2,3 Full To send  To receive 
User 0.449*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.056*** 0.109*** 
 (0.051) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.015) (0.038) 
Savings -0.031* -0.039 -0.038 -0.035 -0.0001 -0.035 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.003) (0.024) 
Loans 0.066* 0.063* 0.061 0.061 0.012** 0.049 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.005) (0.038) 
Insurance  -0.035 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.03) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.008) (0.031) 
Assets 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.008 
 (0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.009) 
       
Age  -4.14e -0.001 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (9.69e) (0.001) 
Education  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Adults  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Spanish  -0.029 -0.028 -0.026 -0.002 -0.025 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.004) (0.027) 
Food security  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 1.04e-05 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
       
Business operator   0.028 0.025 -0.005 0.031 
   (0.032) (0.031) (0.004) (0.031) 
Dayworker   0.013 0.005 2.65e-05 0.005 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.016) 
Other   0.055 0.05 0.001 0.05 
   (0.05) (0.049) (0.008) (0.049) 
Public   0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.01 
   (0.032) (0.032) (0.008) (0.03) 
Extra Income    0.005 0.002 0.008 -0.006 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.007) (0.018) 
Mobile Phone    -0.059 -0.058 -0.0002 -0.058 
   (0.058) (0.058) (0.003) (0.058) 
       
Semi-rural    0.055* 0.054*** 0.001 
    (0.029) (0.01) (0.027) 
Urban    0.009 -0.001 0.01 
    (0.018) (0.003) (0.02) 
       
Constant 0.004 0.004 0.046 0.044 -0.001 0.045 
 (0.019) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.01) (0.044) 
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467 
R-squared 0.325 0.103 0.117 0.120 0.093 0.079 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panajachel that contribute to their significance. However, when only looking at 
Santa Cruz, they matter much less as is seen in the Table B2 in Appendix B. 
Finally, in Model 1, it is peculiarly that Mobilephone has a negative coefficient. I 
checked to see if this result was due to outliers, but found none. To summarize, 
overall the results of the first sensitivity analysis reinforce the results of the 
baseline models, especially for the significance and effect for the use of Tigo 
Money.  
Next, I added squared variables for Age and Education to the baseline 
specification, to see if this provides a better fit. I also removed the dummy 
Savings and Loans, and instead include dummies only for households that save 
using a bank account or received a loan from a bank (i.e. a formal financial 
institutions). These were included to test the robustness of User, and to investigate 
the effect of formal financial institutions. The results are included in Appendix C. 
The inclusion of the Age^2 and Education^2 have little to none influence on 
the estimations, as they fail to be significant in any of the models. This indicates 
that the probability of increased transfer activity is not correlated with any of the 
variables for age. Education, the original non-squared variable, is significant in 
some models, but never at the one percent significance level. Additionally, the 
coefficient is often very small.  
More can be said about the dummy for the use of formal financial services. 
Overall the significance for Savings at bank disappears, and Insurance is 
significant only once (again with a positive effect, like in the baseline model). 
This suggest that the use of formal financial services does not matter for whether 
or not a household will participate in a transfer within an informal social network. 
Loans at bank is still significant in two models. In addition, the coefficient is still 
positive. This confirms the findings of the baseline models, as there is a positive 
correlation for both Loans, and Loans at bank, and increased transfer activity. 
Thus, this confirms the idea that households combine different financial services 
if able. 
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6 Discussion 
First are the results from the previous chapter discussed in detail, focusing on the 
significance and effect of the variables of most interest. Then, the discussion is 
about the model in general, its specifications and performance.  
6.1 The results 
Except for the rural subsample, Tigo Money had a significant positive effect 
across the three models. The results indicate that the use of Tigo Money is 
significantly correlated to an increased probability to participate in a transfer, and 
to do so in an expanded network. In addition, usage is significantly correlated 
with an increased probability to send or receive transfers for emergency support. 
The findings are in line with results of previous research.  
Attention should also be given to the variables for household finances: 
Savings, Loans, Insurance and Assets. The assumption was that they would have a 
negative affect on transfer behavior. As it turns out, the results suggest a more 
complex relationship. When significant, Savings had a negative effect, which 
means that households with savings are less likely to participate in any transfers, 
no matter the network extent or reason behind the transfer. This behavior was 
expected, as savings indicate that a household is in possession of some resources 
that could be used in case of a negative income shock.  
Loans, when significant, always correlates positively with transfer 
participation. This was not expected and it is difficult to identify the need for the 
transfer. On the one hand, a loan indicates a lack of money, and indirectly a need 
for transfers. On the other hand, a loan could also indicate entrepreneurship, as the 
money could be used for investments of some sort. Therefore it is unclear whether 
the transfer is to offset a negative income shock, or used by the receiving 
household as investment capital. Since no data was collected about negative 
shocks nothing can be said about the situation for the individual household. 
Nonetheless the transfer indicates that transfers are a way of getting money when 
needed, and that households combine different sources of credit if possible. 
Insurance behaves like expected when significant, as it is negatively 
correlated with receiving a transfer from a more extensive network. This makes 
sense, as insurance provides the type of financial protection the transfer is 
supposed provide as well. It could be an indication that insurance and transfers are 
substitutes rather than complements. Additionally, it could be the case that people 
with insurance are less likely to contact households that are more socially distant 
(relatives and friends), and instead turn to closer family members for transfers. 
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Assets is only significant for one model: it increases the probability of 
participating in an expanded network. The variable is significant only at the ten 
percent level, and it has a positive effect on transfer activity. I had expected a 
negative effect, as assets owned are indicators for household wealth.  
It is bit surprising that the number of adults in a household does not seem to 
matter for transfer behavior. It is only significant for households in Santa Cruz 
that send transfers to a relative or friend. One could spontaneously believe more 
adults would correlate with more access to different networks, and therefore more 
transfer activity. However, the result does not go against previous research, as the 
literature has shown that the formation of social network is more complex than a 
numbers game. Or to put it another way: it is the quality of the bond between 
households that matters, not the quantity. 
Semi-rural, the variable indicating if the household is located in Santa Cruz, is 
significant in each model. Except for one instance, the correlation is always 
positive for transfer activity: thus, households in Santa Cruz are more likely to 
participate in a transfer than other subsamples. This can be interpreted in two 
ways. On one hand, the significance could be an outcome of the proximity of a 
Tigo Money agent, combined with the lack of other financial institutions. This 
also suggests how mobile money fills the gap left by formal financial institutions. 
On the other hand, more research is needed, as Santa Cruz could just be an outlier 
in its intensity of transfer activity.  
6.2 The models 
The performance of the models fluctuates depending on the specification and 
subsample. For a start, Tigo Money fails to be a significant variable for 
understanding more about transfer behavior for the rural subsample. This is no 
surprise, considering the very low number of people using the service in this area. 
I tried to correct this by oversampling rural communities, but as it turns out the 
average number of transfers is very low. I still decided to include the subsample in 
my analysis, and the applied survey weight greatly reduces the risk for any 
estimation biases due to the rural sample. The models perform better with the 
subsamples of Santa Cruz and Panajachel. The first sensitivity analysis, except for 
the rural subsample, confirms the robustness of the baseline specifications.  
There are still some issues I would like to address. A problem every researcher 
in social sciences struggle with is potentially omitted variables, as does this study. 
Firstly, as discussed above, the use of Tigo Money could not be used to 
understand the transfer behavior in the rural subsample. It is clear that other 
independent variables are needed for an appropriate estimation. I am also aware of 
the fact that model 3, on the probability of receiving an emergency transfer, most 
likely suffers from omitted variables. Few variables are significant, and the 
overall fit is not great. If possible, I would advocate the inclusion of more data on 
negative shocks at household, village and regional level, as it would probably 
better explain the circumstances under which households send and receive 
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emergency transfers. Much of the cited research uses this type of data. At the 
outset of specifying model 3, I was aware of the fact that I probably lacked 
adequate data. Despite this, I decided to analyze emergency transfers in order to 
better compare my findings with previous research. Even though my cross-
sectional study probably suffers from omitted variables, my results indicate how 
the use of Tigo Money positively correlates with emergency transfers being sent 
and received. These findings add to the growing body of research, especially since 
this study is conducted in an underrepresented region. As mentioned earlier in this 
paper, this ability of cross-sectional studies to empirically test interesting theories 
should not be underestimated.  
Additionally, it would be interesting to see how my estimation would have 
performed with more data on the size of the household network. Unfortunately, to 
gather data that detailed was not feasible for this study.  
Finally, the impact formal finance has on transfer activity is unclear. In the 
baseline model, each variable has a different effect. When only including 
dummies for formal finance, the significance of several variables mostly 
disappears. Primarily, this confirms the overall impact of Tigo Money, as it does 
not matter whether or not the households are financially included. Additionally, it 
shows that households are able, and willing, to mix formal and informal services 
to reach their financial goals.  
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7 Conclusions 
Transfers within informal social networks play a big role in many developing 
societies, as they allow household to reduce risk. However, high transaction costs 
lower the level of protection enjoyed by the households. Mobile money is one 
way to lower these cost.  
This paper investigates the mobile money service called Tigo Money, and if it 
has an impacts on the transfer behavior of household. Survey data is used from 
two municipalities in Guatemala. The data is weighted accordingly, and OLS 
estimations are used for the analysis.  
The results strongly indicates that Tigo Money indeed is positively correlated 
with an increased probability of sending and receiving more transfer, doing so 
with a more extensive network of household, and participating in an informal 
insurance network. These findings are in line with theory and the result of 
previous research. The results are robust for semi-rural and urban subsamples over 
several different model specifications. However, the model is less successful in 
estimating the transfer behavior in rural subsamples, as too few users and transfers 
were recorded in the survey data.  
With the rapid development in the field of mobile money more research is 
needed. In this paper I only studied the effect mobile money has on transfer 
activity, but I did not try to answer why households adopt the technology, or what 
practical impact more transfers have on the wellbeing of the household members. 
Therefore, there is plenty to interest researchers in behavioral economics and 
microfinance. First, more needs to be known about the adoption of mobile money, 
especially since many groups suffer from digital illiteracy and have difficulties 
adopting modern technology even though it would benefit them. Secondly, more 
can be done to map transfer behavior: who sends to whom? And why? Panel data 
or transfer journals would provide useful data. Another interesting topic would be 
to use methods of big data analysis to search for any patterns among all the 
millions of transactions taking place. Thirdly, what impact does more transfers 
have on the household. Are the transfers mostly used for support in the case of 
negative income shocks, or is the money invested in schooling, assets or any 
income-generating activities? Finally, as this paper shows the mixed effects 
household finances have on transfer activity, it would be interesting to investigate 
the relationship between informal and formal financial services. This would also 
be of interest for public institutions, as mobile money could impact financial 
markets.  
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Part 1: C
haractersitics of the household 
Part 2: The use of m
obile 
phones 
Part 3: O
ccupation 
Q
uestions 7-9 refer to the last 7 days. 
H
 
O
 
U
 S 
E 
H
 
O
 
L 
D
    
1. H
ow
 
old are 
you? 
2. Y
our 
education? 3. W
hich 
language do 
you speak 
at hom
e? 
 Spanish..1 
K
aqchikel..
2 Other..3 
 
4. 
Including 
you, how
 
m
any 
adults live 
in this 
dw
elling? 
 
5. D
oes your 
household 
posses at least 
one m
obile 
phone? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2 (-> 7) 
 
6. H
as 
anyone in 
your 
household 
used Tigo 
M
oney in 
during the 
last 4 w
eeks? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2  
 
7. O
f the 
adults in 
this 
househol
d: how
 
m
any 
w
ork 
outside 
of the 
hom
e? 
8. W
hat is the m
ost 
im
portant incom
e of 
this household. 
 A
gricultural..1 
C
rafting..2 
Tourism
...3 
Public sector..4 
Private C
om
pany ..5 
Private individual..6 
V
ending...7 
D
ayw
orker..8 
U
nem
ployed..9 
O
ther..10 
9. D
oes your household 
has any extra incom
e 
from
 any of the 
follow
ing? 
 A
gricultural..1 
C
rafting..2 
Tourism
...3 
Public sector..4 
Private C
om
pany ..5 
Private individual..6 
V
ending...7 
D
ayw
orker..8 
U
nem
ployed..9 
O
ther..10 
 
Y
ears 
Y
ears 
C
ode 
N
um
ber of: 
 
 
N
um
ber 
Type 
C
ode 
C
ode 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
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C
om
m
unity/N
eighborhood:___________________ 
D
ate:____________ 
A
sk: I w
onder if it is posible to talk to the person responsable for sending and receiving transfers in this household.  
 
Part 4: Food security 
Q
uestions 10-12 refer to the last 4 w
eeks. 
H
 
O
 
U
 S 
E 
H
 
O
 
L 
D
  10. D
id you w
orry that your 
household w
ould not have 
enough food? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2 (-> 11) 
 
If so, how
 often 
did this happen? 
 R
arely..1 
Som
etim
es..2 
O
ften..3 
11. W
ere you or any 
household m
em
ber not able 
to eat the kind of foods you 
preferred because of a lack 
of resources? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2 (-> 12) 
 
If so, how
 often 
did this happen? 
 R
arely..1 
Som
etim
es..2 
O
ften..3 
12. D
id you or any 
household m
em
ber 
have to eat a sm
aller 
m
eal than you felt you 
needed because there 
w
as not enough food? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2 (-> 13) 
 
If so, how
 often 
did this happen? 
 R
arely..1 
Som
etim
es..2 
O
ften..3 
 
 
Frequency 
 
Frequency 
 
Frequency 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
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C
om
m
unity/N
eighborhood:___________________ 
D
ate:____________ 
 
Part 5: H
ousehold finances 
Q
uestions 13-16 refer to your household. 
H
 
O
 
U
 S 
E 
H
 
O
 
L 
D
  
13. D
oes 
your 
household 
save any 
m
oney? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2 (-> 14) 
 
If so, does your household 
save in any of the 
follow
ing w
ays? 
 C
ash at hom
e..1 
B
ank account..2 
C
ooperative..3 
A
t a relative..4 
A
t a friend..5 
O
ther..6 
 
14. H
as your 
household 
borrow
ed any 
m
oney in the 
last 6 m
onths? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2 (-> 15) 
 
If so, exactly w
here did 
your household borrow
? 
 B
ank..1 
Paw
nshop..2 
G
overnm
ent agency..3 
Landlord..4 
Em
ployer..5 
C
ooperative..6 
R
elative...7 
Friend..8 
O
ther..9 
 
15. D
oes your 
household have 
any form
 of 
insurance 
coverage? 
 Y
es..1 
N
o..2 (-> 16) 
 
If so, from
 w
here does 
your household get this 
coverage? 
 Through a household 
m
em
ber ..1 
Em
ployer..2 
G
overnm
ent program
..3 
B
ought through a private 
insurer..4 
Paid for by relative..5 
O
ther..6 
 
16. ¿D
oes your 
household ow
n 
any of the 
follow
ing assets? 
 Land..1 
Land for 
farm
ing..2 
R
eal estate..3 
B
oat..4 
C
ar..5 
Livestock..6 
B
usiness..7 
O
ther..8 
 
 
 
C
ode 
 
Type 
C
ode 
 
Type 
C
ode 
C
ode 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A
-4 
C
om
m
unity/Sector:___________________ 
D
ate:____________ 
 
D
uring the last 4 w
eeks, has anyone in your household received or sent financial help (rem
ittances, transfers or credit) from
 som
eone that is not 
part of this household or lives in this dw
elling? For exam
ple, financial support from
 fam
ily m
em
bers living in other com
m
unities, friends or 
neighbors? If so, please tell m
e m
ore about these transfers.  
H
 
O
 
U
 S 
E 
H
 
O
 
L 
D
  
N
 
R
 
D
id 
you 
receive 
or 
send 
the 
transfer? 
 1) 
R
eveiv
ed 
2) 
Sent  
W
hich 
type 
of 
transfe
r 
w
as 
it? 
 1) 
M
on
ey 
2) 
C
redi
t 
H
ow
 do you know
 
the 
person 
that 
received/sent 
the 
transfer? 
 1) 
Spouse 
2) 
Parent 
3) 
Son/daughter 
4) 
Sibling 
5) 
R
elative 
6) 
Friend 
7) 
O
ther 
 
T
ravel tim
e to 
w
here 
the 
other 
person 
lives 
 D
o not fill if the 
person 
lives 
abroad. 
W
hich 
m
ethod 
did 
you 
use 
to 
send/receive 
the 
transfer 
 1) 
Sent in cash 
2) 
In person 
3) 
Tigo M
oney 
4) 
W
estern 
U
/M
oney 
G
ram
 
etc 
5) 
B
ank  
6) 
O
ther 
  
W
hat w
as the 
sum
 
of 
the 
transfer? 
 
1) 
0–25Q
 
2) 
26-150Q
 
3) 
150-1000Q
 
4) 
1000Q
 
or 
m
ore  
  
W
hat w
as the reason 
for sending/receiving 
the transfer? 
 1) 
Em
ergency reasons 
2) 
A
 loan/credit 
3) 
To repay a debt 
4) 
R
egular support 
5) 
N
o particular reason 
6) 
O
ther 
 
A
re 
you 
expecte
d 
to 
repay 
the 
transfe
r? 
 1) 
Y
es 
2) 
N
o 
H
ours 
M
inutes 
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Appendix B  
Table B1: Probability of transfer, divided by subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Rural Semi-rural Urban 
User 0.222 0.900*** 0.659*** 
 (0.252) (0.109) (0.0571) 
Savings 0.0535 -0.280* -0.0438 
 (0.0881) (0.144) (0.0271) 
Loans 0.165*** 0.0248 0.0945** 
 (0.0635) (0.0933) (0.0457) 
Insurance -0.0482 - 0.0208 
 (0.123)  (0.0413) 
Assets 0.0109 -0.0216 0.00890 
 (0.0366) (0.100) (0.0118) 
Age 0.00178 0.0114** 0.000395 
 (0.00243) (0.00456) (0.00120) 
Education 0.0223 0.00241 0.00747* 
 (0.0155) (0.0147) (0.00424) 
Adults -0.0189 -0.0823*** 0.00393 
 (0.0165) (0.0207) (0.00535) 
Spanish -0.138 - -0.00751 
 (0.104)  (0.0309) 
Food security 0.000600 0.0528 0.00439 
 (0.0125) (0.0327) (0.00670) 
Business operator -0.0223 -0.337 0.0450 
 (0.0755) (0.262) (0.0403) 
Dayworker -0.0411 -0.0864 0.0194 
 (0.0443) (0.266) (0.0342) 
Other 0.0297 0.126 0.160** 
 (0.0884) (0.299) (0.0770) 
Public -0.0314 -0.366 0.0600 
 (0.0635) (0.287) (0.0517) 
Extra Income -0.0137 -0.0897 -0.0216 
 (0.0958) (0.0824) (0.0256) 
Mobile Phone  -0.0903 0.264*** -0.141* 
 (0.0975) (0.0799) (0.0811) 
    
Constant 0.0471 -0.536 -0.0141 
 (0.160) (0.384) (0.0734) 
Observations 122 88 257 
R-squared 0.175 0.527 0.555 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B2: Probability of expanded network, divided by subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Rural Semi-rural Urban 
User 0.311 0.418*** 0.453*** 
 (0.243) (0.0970) (0.0563) 
Savings 0.00183 -0.0581 -0.0504* 
 (0.0184) (0.0547) (0.0270) 
Loans 0.118** 0.0410 0.0653 
 (0.0464) (0.0301) (0.0451) 
Insurance -0.0505 - -0.0631* 
 (0.0448)  (0.0377) 
Assets 0.0189 -0.00267 0.0223* 
 (0.0174) (0.0303) (0.0126) 
Age 0.00284 -0.000699 -0.00150 
 (0.00179) (0.00126) (0.000963) 
Education 0.00501 -0.00734 0.00116 
 (0.00528) (0.00688) (0.00292) 
Adults -0.0108 -0.00117 0.00681 
 (0.0100) (0.00977) (0.00543) 
Spanish 0.0500 - 0.0235 
 (0.0312)  (0.0285) 
Food security 0.00316 0.00892 0.00450 
 (0.00582) (0.0128) (0.00613) 
Business operator -0.0663 -0.114 0.0371 
 (0.0614) (0.104) (0.0366) 
Dayworker -0.0106 -0.0203 0.00877 
 (0.0291) (0.0369) (0.0264) 
Other -0.0364 0.00365 0.123* 
 (0.0375) (0.0572) (0.0709) 
Public -0.0141 -0.399*** 0.0826 
 (0.0386) (0.115) (0.0523) 
Extra Income -0.0895* -0.0349 -0.0185 
 (0.0521) (0.0298) (0.0242) 
Mobile Phone  -0.0352 0.00566 -0.0846 
 (0.0519) (0.0157) (0.0728) 
    
Constant -0.0966 0.000250 0.0384 
 (0.110) (0.0912) (0.0582) 
Observations 122 88 257 
R-squared 0.297 0.376 0.370 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B3: Probability of emergency transfer, divided by subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Rural Semi-rural Urban 
User 0.327 0.478*** 0.127*** 
 (0.246) (0.105) (0.0424) 
Savings 0.00986 -0.159 -0.0318 
 (0.0131) (0.119) (0.0258) 
Loans 0.0943** 0.0106 0.0546 
 (0.0431) (0.0437) (0.0459) 
Insurance -0.0414 - 0.00493 
 (0.0382)  (0.0351) 
Assets 0.0166 0.0489 0.00700 
 (0.0165) (0.0677) (0.0108) 
Age 0.000982 -0.000773 -0.000759 
 (0.000987) (0.00272) (0.000909) 
Education 0.00245 0.00312 0.000753 
 (0.00446) (0.0132) (0.00264) 
Adults -0.0120 -0.0335 0.000144 
 (0.00939) (0.0204) (0.00430) 
Spanish 0.0439 - -0.0226 
 (0.0292)  (0.0289) 
Food security -0.00203 0.0205 -0.00151 
 (0.00347) (0.0217) (0.00560) 
Business operator 0.00477 0.108 0.0449 
 (0.0254) (0.147) (0.0329) 
Dayworker 0.00850 0.0362 0.0159 
 (0.0231) (0.0577) (0.0191) 
Other -0.0130 0.126 0.0827 
 (0.0316) (0.133) (0.0698) 
Public 0.0137 -0.591*** 0.0166 
 (0.0186) (0.182) (0.0368) 
Extra Income -0.0671 -0.0430 0.0111 
 (0.0508) (0.0481) (0.0219) 
Mobile Phone  -0.0643 0.0237 -0.0691 
 (0.0499) (0.0372) (0.0720) 
    
Constant 0.0228 -0.111 0.0709 
 (0.0537) (0.159) (0.0519) 
Observations 122 88 257 
R-squared 0.303 0.348 0.104 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C  
Table C1: Probability of sending or receiving transfer, added Age^2, Education^2 and formal finance dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full To send To receive 
User 0.641*** 0.219*** 0.423*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0361) (0.0574) 
Savings at bank  -0.00495 -0.0114 0.00648 
 (0.0243) (0.0141) (0.0262) 
Loans at bank  0.110* 0.0334** 0.0764 
 (0.0643) (0.0169) (0.0666) 
Insurance  0.0333 0.0144 0.0189 
 (0.0450) (0.0203) (0.0480) 
Assets -0.000756 -0.00171 0.000953 
 (0.0137) (0.00754) (0.0159) 
Age -0.000366 -0.00161 0.00125 
 (0.00395) (0.00129) (0.00407) 
Age2 2.30e-05 1.29e-05 1.01e-05 
 (4.28e-05) (1.34e-05) (4.31e-05) 
Education 0.0155** 0.00268 0.0128** 
 (0.00636) (0.00218) (0.00608) 
Education^2 -0.000488 -0.000154 -0.000334 
 (0.000308) (0.000124) (0.000296) 
Adults -0.00144 0.00674** -0.00818* 
 (0.00454) (0.00330) (0.00478) 
Spanish -0.00437 0.0164 -0.0208 
 (0.0295) (0.0142) (0.0317) 
Food security 0.00253 0.00172 0.000811 
 (0.00592) (0.00259) (0.00606) 
Business operator 0.00960 -0.00892 0.0185 
 (0.0362) (0.0118) (0.0357) 
Dayworker -0.0212 0.00102 -0.0222 
 (0.0309) (0.00888) (0.0298) 
Other 0.120** 0.0395** 0.0806 
 (0.0602) (0.0167) (0.0625) 
Public -0.00282 -0.0185 0.0156 
 (0.0459) (0.0206) (0.0534) 
Extra income -0.0314 -0.00928 -0.0222 
 (0.0242) (0.0128) (0.0253) 
Mobile Phone  -0.0950 -0.00424 -0.0908 
 (0.0658) (0.00819) (0.0665) 
Semi-rural 0.164*** 0.0859*** 0.0785 
 (0.0538) (0.01000) (0.0540) 
Urban -0.0708** -0.00392 -0.0669** 
 (0.0333) (0.0123) (0.0334) 
Constant 0.0523 -0.00388 0.0562 
 (0.107) (0.0444) (0.111) 
Observations 467 467 467 
R-squared 0.490 0.259 0.280 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  C-2 
 
Table C2: Probability of expanded network, added Age^2, Education^2 and formal finance dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full To send To receive 
User 0.436*** 0.174*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0357) (0.0483) 
Savings at bank  -0.0221 -0.0113 -0.0108 
 (0.0209) (0.0134) (0.0190) 
Loans at bank  0.105 0.0231 0.0824 
 (0.0653) (0.0156) (0.0662) 
Insurance  -0.0569 0.0177 -0.0746** 
 (0.0358) (0.0199) (0.0342) 
Assets 0.0141 0.00242 0.0116 
 (0.0126) (0.00681) (0.0140) 
Age -0.00282 -0.000609 -0.00221 
 (0.00347) (0.00123) (0.00345) 
Age^2 3.03e-05 2.20e-06 2.81e-05 
 (3.66e-05) (1.29e-05) (3.59e-05) 
Education 0.00725* 0.00120 0.00606* 
 (0.00401) (0.00194) (0.00348) 
Education^2 -0.000350 -9.70e-05 -0.000253 
 (0.000227) (0.000109) (0.000199) 
Adults 0.00410 0.00724** -0.00314 
 (0.00437) (0.00316) (0.00381) 
Spanish 0.0339 0.0213 0.0126 
 (0.0256) (0.0140) (0.0255) 
Food security 0.00226 0.000369 0.00189 
 (0.00526) (0.00249) (0.00491) 
Business operator 0.00971 -0.00754 0.0172 
 (0.0326) (0.0112) (0.0310) 
Dayworker -0.0148 0.000997 -0.0158 
 (0.0220) (0.00747) (0.0198) 
Other 0.0674 0.0445*** 0.0229 
 (0.0471) (0.0162) (0.0474) 
Public 0.0317 -0.0201 0.0519 
 (0.0446) (0.0178) (0.0481) 
Extra income -0.0301 -0.0130 -0.0171 
 (0.0222) (0.0119) (0.0210) 
Mobile Phone  -0.0705 -0.00407 -0.0664 
 (0.0553) (0.00730) (0.0553) 
Semi-rural -0.0151 0.0351*** -0.0502*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0114) (0.0170) 
Urban -0.0110 0.00203 -0.0130 
 (0.0233) (0.0117) (0.0210) 
Constant 0.0627 -0.0200 0.0826 
 (0.0939) (0.0410) (0.0907) 
Observations 467 467 467 
R-squared 0.353 0.209 0.191 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C3: Probability of emergency transfer, added Age^2, Education^2 and formal finance dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full To send To receive 
User 0.161*** 0.0563*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0145) (0.0375) 
Savings at bank -0.0133 0.00521 -0.0185 
 (0.0175) (0.00641) (0.0166) 
Loan at bank  0.0991 0.0164 0.0827 
 (0.0661) (0.0105) (0.0657) 
Insurance  -0.00720 0.00180 -0.00900 
 (0.0334) (0.00685) (0.0332) 
Assets 0.00205 -0.00177 0.00382 
 (0.0115) (0.00328) (0.0113) 
Age -0.000641 -0.000759 0.000118 
 (0.00317) (0.000484) (0.00319) 
Age^2 6.45e-06 7.23e-06 -7.76e-07 
 (3.08e-05) (5.05e-06) (3.09e-05) 
Education 0.00628* 0.000425 0.00585* 
 (0.00364) (0.00123) (0.00346) 
Education^2 -0.000287 -1.37e-05 -0.000273 
 (0.000193) (6.26e-05) (0.000183) 
Adults -0.00215 -0.00137 -0.000774 
 (0.00344) (0.00130) (0.00328) 
Spanish -0.0249 -0.00164 -0.0232 
 (0.0252) (0.00426) (0.0251) 
Food security -0.000210 0.000234 -0.000444 
 (0.00489) (0.00102) (0.00486) 
Business operator 0.0226 -0.00560 0.0282 
 (0.0286) (0.00476) (0.0286) 
Dayworker -0.000440 -0.000864 0.000424 
 (0.0155) (0.00402) (0.0151) 
Other 0.0489 0.000662 0.0482 
 (0.0435) (0.00777) (0.0438) 
Public -0.0156 -0.0111 -0.00444 
 (0.0290) (0.00957) (0.0263) 
Extra income 0.000894 0.00810 -0.00720 
 (0.0199) (0.00628) (0.0193) 
Mobile Phone  -0.0566 -0.000459 -0.0561 
 (0.0546) (0.00310) (0.0548) 
Semi-rural 0.0615** 0.0556*** 0.00582 
 (0.0289) (0.0105) (0.0270) 
Urban -0.00817 -0.00280 -0.00537 
 (0.0188) (0.00406) (0.0181) 
Constant 0.0518 0.0175 0.0343 
 (0.0910) (0.0198) (0.0909) 
Observations 467 467 467 
R-squared 0.129 0.095 0.087 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
